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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Scott Onock lacks standing to pursue this derivative action in behalf of Micron 
Technology, Inc. ("Micron") because he failed to first make a demand on Micron's Board of 
Directors to investigate and evaluate the claims. A "derivative action is an action brought by one 
or more stockholders of a corporation to enforce a corporate right or remedy a wrong to the 
corporation in cases where the corporation, because it is controlled by the wrongdoers or for other 
reasons fails and refuses to take appropriate action for its own protection." McCann v. McCann, 
138 Idaho 228, 233 (2002). Thus, a shareholder plaintiff in a derivative action does not assert 
claims for his or her own benefit, but rather for the benefit of the corporation. The claim (and any 
recovery) belongs to the corporation, not to the shareholder individually. See Tooley v. Donaldson, 
Lu@n & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004). 
Here, Mr. Orrock alleges that he is a Micron shareholder and purports to bring this 
derivative action in Micron's behalf against certain of its officers and directors for allegedly 
participating in or failing to prevent price-fixing activity. A derivative action, however, is a 
procedural device reserved for rare instances where the corporation's board of directors, normally 
entrusted with such decisions because it is presumed to be best situated to determine what is in the 
corporation's best interests, cannot be trusted to direct litigation on the corporation's behalf. A 
shareholder seeking to assert a claim in behalf of the corporation is normally expected to respect 
the role of the board and f ~ s t  make a demand upon it, requesting that the directors investigate and 
determine whether to pursue the action before the shareholder files suit. This is so even if, as is the 
case here, the shareholder accuses some directors of wrongdoing. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Orrock brought this litigation without first making a demand on 
Micron's Board of Directors. Thus, to have standing to sue derivatively, Mr. Orrock must satisfy 
an exacting standard: he must plead particularized facts sufficient to show that demand would 
have been "futile" because a majority of the Board at the time the action was filed was not 
sufficiently disinterested or independent to impartially evaluate the claim. Only then would he be 
allowed to take control of Micron's alleged claim from its Board of Directors. Rarely can a 
shareholder make the requisite showing, given the high legal standard and presumption that 
directors will act in the company's best interests. 
Mr. Orrock's task is made much more difficult due to the fact that, of Micron's nine 
directors at the time the lawsuit was filed (eight of whom are outside directors with no day-to-day 
involvement with Micron), four are not defendants here and their ability to consider a demand is 
not challenged. Accordingly, to disqualify a majority of Micron's Board, he must demonstrate 
with particularity that not a single one of the remaining five board members can fairly evaluate a 
demand. Thus, it is not surprising that, despite multiple attempts and explicit guidance from the 
District Court, Mr. Orrock has been unable to plead adequately that demand on Micron's Board 
was excused. 
As detailed below, the District Court twice granted Micron's motions to dismiss, holding 
that Mr. Orrock's generic and conclusory allegations of director dominance, friendships, 
compensation, or service on particular committees were insufficient to rebut the presumption that 
Micron's directors were independent. Mr. Orrock does not challenge that fmding on appeal. 
Additionally, the District Court held that Mr. Orrock failed to plead that Micron's directors faced a 
substantial likelihood of liability that would render them interested and, thus, not able to properly 
consider a demand. In doing so, the District Court rejected allegations that various news articles 
published before mid-2002 constituted "red flags" alerting the Board to price-fixing activity by 
Micron employees that should have caused the directors to take action earlier than they did. While 
the Board certainly knew about potential antitrust problems after the Department of Justice 
("DOJ") issued a subpoena to Micron in June 2002, Micron cooperated actively and fully with the 
DOJ and worked to mitigate any damages to the Company. Mr. Onock did not plead any facts 
suggesting that the Board should have been aware of the issue or taken action any sooner than it 
did, or that its subsequent actions were not enough. Accordingly, because Mr. Orrock failed to 
rebut the presumption that a majority of Micron's Board could impartially consider a demand, 
demand is not excused. Mr. Orrock thus lacks standing to usurp the Board's authority and pursue 
claims derivatively in behalf of Micron. 
11. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Micron And Its Board Of Directors 
Micron is one of the world's leading providers of semiconductor devices used in a variety 
of electronics equipment, including personal computers, network servers, and mobile phones. R. 
Vol. 11, p. 287, 7 5; p. 293, 7 22. One of its principal products is Dynamic Random Access 
Memory, or "DRAM," which provides data storage and retrieval. R. Vol. 11, p. 287,y 5. 
At the time this action was commenced, Micron's Board of Directors was composed of 
nine members, eight of whom were outside directors with no day-to-day management 
responsibilities. Only five of the nine directors who comprised the Board of Directors at the time 
the lawsuit was filed are defendants here. 
The directors who were on the Board when the action was filed and who were named as 
defendants are Steven Appleton (Micron's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of 
Directors) and outside directors James Bagley, Robert Lothrop, Gordon Smith and William 
Webber. R. Vol. 11, pp. 293-296,vy 23-29. The directors who were on the Board at the time of the 
filing of this action and who were not named defendants are Dr. Teruaki Aoki, Mercedes Johnson, 
Lawrence N. Mondry and Robert Switz. R. Vol. 11, p. 321,y 107. Mr. Orrock makes no claims of 
liability or wrongdoing against the non-defendant directors. A chart listing the directors and 
summarizing arguments regarding their alleged interest is attached as Exhibit A.' 
B. June 2002: Allegations Of Micron's Involvement In Price-Fixing Activity 
First Come To Light; Micron Promptly Takes Action 
In 2002, the Department of Justice initiated an investigation into alleged anticompetitive 
practices among DRAM manufacturers. Micron's involvement in the DOJ investigation began in 
June 2002, when Micron received a subpoena seeking information regarding possible antitrust 
Each of the exhibits referenced herein were exhibits to pleadings filed with the District Court 
included in the Certificate of Exhibits. For the Court's convenience, copies of the exhibits are 
attached hereto. References to these exhibits will be in the form "Ex. -." 
violations. See R. Val. 11, pp. 289, tj  13, p. 309, 1 76. As the District Court recognized, Micron's 
Board responded promptly, fully cooperating with the DOJ investigation and mitigating any 
damages to the Company. R. Val. 11, pp. 224,404, 408-409. Indeed, it was widely reported that 
Micron cooperated "fully and actively" with the DOJ (including providing the DOJ with evidence) 
in connection with the DOJ's Corporate Leniency Policy. R. Val. 11, pp. 314-319,1194-96, 98, 
99. Pursuant to the policy, in exchange for Micron's full, continuing and complete cooperation in 
the DOJ investigation, Micron was not subject to prosecution, fines or other penalties. Id Certain 
of Micron's competitors, on the other hand, were heavily fined, together paying penalties in excess 
of $730 million. R. Val. 11, pp. 316-319, tjtj 96, 98, 99; see also id at p. 314, 1/ 93 (Micron 
competitors Infineon fined $160 million, Hynix fined $185 million and Samsung fined $300 
million as criminal penalties). 
Following the announcement of the DOJ investigation, several news articles were 
published discussing the investigation and Micron's possible role in price-fixing activity. R. Val. 
11, pp. 310-31 1,tjT 77-85. The DOJ investigation also prompted the filing of a number of lawsuits 
against Micron and other DRAM suppliers, including over 20 actions in federal court, at least 61 
state court actions, three Canadian cases, and a number of actions by state attorneys general. R. 
Val. 11, p. 292-293,Y 20. None of Micron's directors were named in those actions. 
In February 2006, the first of five securities class action complaints was filed against 
Micron and certain of its officers in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, and 
those actions have now been consolidated (collectively, the "Federal Action"). The Federal 
Action, which is still pending, is premised on purported false and misleading statements regarding 
price-fixing activity. Id. 
111. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A. The First Amended Complaint And Its Dismissal 
Mr. Orrock filed his initial complaint in this action on March 6, 2006 against certain of 
Micron's officers and directors alleging that they participated in or failed to prevent the price- 
fixing activity. The complaint mirrored the core allegations of the Federal Action. Following the 
filing of an amended complaint in the Federal Action, Mr. Orrock filed an amended complaint here 
(the "First Amended Complaint"). Like its predecessor, the First Amended Complaint was 
premised on the price-fixing activity alleged in the Federal Action. It asserted various breaches of 
duty by the individual defendants based on their purported participation in andlor failure to prevent 
allegedly illegal activities. It claimed further that Micron had been damaged by the costs 
associated with the investigation and defense of the various legal actions and by the tarnishing of 
Micron's corporate image and goodwill. Mr. Onock admittedly did not make a demand on 
Micron's Board prior to instituting this lawsuit, instead contending that demand was futile. 
Micron moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 2 3 0  for hilure to make the requisite demand on its Board of Directors, or to plead with 
particularity why such demand was excused. Micron also moved to dismiss for lack of standing 
based on Mr. Orrock's failure to plead the details of his stock ownership in accordance with the 
strictly constmed "continuous ownership" requirement. 
In an Order issued on May 29, 2007, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss, 
holding that demand on Micron's Board would not have been futile. R. Vol. 11, p. 219. In order to 
properly plead demand futility, Mr. Orrock had to allege particularized facts sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness and independence of five of Micron's nine directors. 
Id. The District Court found that he had failed to do so. Id at 219-226. 
First, Mr. Orrock failed to allege particularized facts to rebut the presumption that Micron's 
directors were independent. Generic allegations that the directors were unable to act independently 
because their compensation was controlled by the members of the compensation committee were 
insufficient. Id at 220-221. Likewise, allegations that certain directors worked together in the 
past, and that a significant business relationship exists between Micron and another company with 
which two directors were affiliated, did not rise to the level of suggesting that any director would 
be incapable of considering a demand. Id at 221-222. 
Additionally, the First Amended Complaint lacked the particularized facts necessary to 
establish that any director had a disabling interest. Mr. Onock was required to allege specific facts 
showing that the directors faced a "substantial likelihood of liability," which arises in "rare cases of 
egregious conduct" by a director. Id. at 222. Although the Board certainly knew about the 
potential issues after the DOJ subpoena issued, the evidence of record showed that the Board fully 
cooperated with the DOJ, thereby mitigating any damage to Micron. Id. at 223-224. In light of 
the Board's prompt response, Mr. Orrock's effort to show a substantial likelihood of director 
liability focused on the Board's supposed pre-subpoena knowledge and conduct. His theory was 
that various news articles published in 2001 through mid-2002 constituted "red flags" that alerted 
the Board to supposed wrongdoing at Micron, and that the Board's purposell ignorance of the 
"red flags" and consequent inaction should subject them to a substantial likelihood of liability. The 
District Court, however, did not "agree that these red flags were waved in the faces of the Board or 
that they should have been put on notice of the potentially illegal activity occurring within the 
DRAM industry as a whole." Id at 223. The facts pleaded did "not suggest that the Board should 
have been aware of the problems or that they should have acted to stop further damage to the 
corporation sooner." Id. at 224. Further, the First Amended Complaint did "not allege 
parlicularized facts indicating that Micron directors played any role in the price-fixing or that the 
directors knew or should have known about the potential role of Micron employees." Id. at 223. 
Because the District Court could not "find that the Board had knowledge of the alleged 
wrongdoings by Micron[,]" Mr. Orrock could not show that the Board purposefully disregarded 
such knowledge, and thus failed to plead around the strong protections afforded by the business 
judgment rule. Id. at 225. 
Thus, because the First Amended Complaint lacked particularized facts showing that a 
majority of the directors were interested due to a substantial likelihood of liability or lacked 
independence, it was insufficient to excuse Mr. Orrock from making a demand on Micron's Board 
prior to filing suit. Id. at 226. The District Court granted Micron's motion to dismiss with leave to 
amend. 
B. The Second And Third Amended Complaints And Dismissal With Prejudice 
Mr. Orrock filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 29, 2007 that was virtually 
identical to the First Amended Complaint, albeit with the addition of allegations relating to several 
news articles published in and after June 2002 in the wake of the DOJ subpoena. Mr. Orrock also 
added allegations that defendant Michael Sadler, Micron's Vice President of Worldwide Sales, met 
with other DRAM manufacturers in October 2001 to determine whether they would be cutting 
DRAM production, and that Mr. Appleton knew about the trip and had planned his own trip lo 
discuss DRAM supply. In connection with the newly cited post-DOJ subpoena articles, Mr. 
Orrock argued that demand was futile because Micron's Board knew about the purported 
wrongdoing after the DOJ subpoena issued, yet ii did nothing in response. Despite making this 
contention, the Second Amended Complaint alleged in numerous places that, following the 
issuance of the DOJ subpoena, Micron's Board fully and actively assisted ihe DOJ in its 
investigation, thereby mitigating any damage to Micron. 
Shortly before Micron was to file its motion to dismiss, Mr. Orrock made an unopposed 
request for leave to amend the complaint and, on September 6, 2007, filed his Third Amended 
Complaint. The Third Amended Complaint recycled the same demand futility arguments rejected 
by the District Court in granting the initial motion to dismiss, including the boilerplate arguments 
Mr. Orrock himself abandoned during the briefing on the motion. R. Vol. 11, pp. 321-331, 7 107. 
It also included the citations to the post-subpoena articles first alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint (R. Vol. 11, pp. 310-11, 77 77-85, pp. 323-324, 7 107(c)) and the unsupported 
allegations regarding Mr. Sadler's October 2001 meetings (R. Vol. 11, p. 307, 77 65-66, p. 323, 7 
107Cb)). 
New to the Third Amended Complaint were allegations premised on an interview given to 
the Idaho Statesman by defendant and then-former Director Gordon Smith. R. Vol. 11, pp. 319- 
320,l 101, pp. 324-325, 107(d); Ex. B. Nothing in the intemiew related to price-fixing, however. 
Id. In the interview, Mr. Smith discussed Micron's recent layoffs and his feeling that the layoffs 
should have happened sooner. He also said that he believed Micron's Board was not well 
informed, was "very passive" and was "not near as aggressive as they should be." Ex. B at 1. 
Based on Mr. Smith's statements, the Third Amended Complaint claimed that a majority of 
Micron's Directors at the time of filing of the derivative action were unable to impartially consider 
a demand because, among other things, they allegedly "failed to act when action was necessary[.]" 
R. Val. 11, pp. 324-325,l 107(d). 
Micron moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint and, in an order dated January 25, 
2008, the District Court granted the motion with prejudice. R. Val. 11, pp. 402-41 1. The District 
Court again rejected Mr. Orrock's boilerplate allegations of director interest, as well as his 
arguments premised on pre-DOJ subpoena "red flags." Id. at 407-408. Further, absent the 
existence of such pre-subpoena "red flags," the Board could not have breached the business 
judgment rule by consciously disregarding them. Id. at 410-41 1.  As to the arguments based on the 
Board's conduct aJter the DOJ subpoena, the District Court reiterated its prior holding "that, once 
subpoenaed, it can be presumed that the Board began to cooperate with the DOJ klly and 
attempted to mitigate the damages to the company because Micron ultimately was ganted 
amnesty. At that point, the directors acted, and thus they are not subject to liability." Id. at 408. 
The Third Amended Complaint contained "nothing ... to rebut the presumption that the directors 
were acting in good faith." Id. at 409. 
The District Court also found that Mr. Orrock again failed to show that a majority of the 
Board at the time of the filing of the derivative action lacked the independence to consider a 
demand, a ruling Mr. Orrock does not challenge on appeal. The District Court recognized that, 
although Mr. Appleton is alleged to have engaged in misconduct, "[c]ommon sense dictates that a 
director engaged in wrongdoing himself would not reveal this to the other directors, and thus it is 
improper to impute knowledge to the entire Board in a situation such as this." R. Vol. 11, p. 409. 
Additionally, nothing in Mr. Smith's interview with the Idaho Statesman suggested that any 
directors were dominated by Mr. Appleton and, indeed, "Smith's statements actually support his 
independence." Id. Because the Third Amended Complaint did "not aver particularized facts 
showing the Directors to be interested and not independent, nor do the facts suggest that the 
Directors breached the business judgment rule," the District Court granted Micron's motion with 
prejudice. Id. at 41 1. It is fiom this Order that Mr. Orrock now appeals. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues identified in Mr. Orrock's opening brief, his appeal raises the 
following issue: 
* whether Mr. Orrock's failure to plead facts showing that he was a Micron shareholder 
continuously since the time of the alleged wrong, thereby failing to satisfy the 
continuous ownership requirement under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), provides 
an independent ground for affirming the District Court's dismissal of the Third 
Amended Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As Mr. Orrock notes, the questions of demand futility are governed by the law of the state 
of incorporation. Brief at 7;2 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991). 
Because Micron is a Delaware corporation, Delaware law applies. Brief at 7. This Court's review 
of the Order granting Micron's motion to dismiss is de novo. Id. 
11. DELAWARE'S RIGOROUS PLEADING STANDARDS IMPOSE A HEAVY 
BURDEN ON A PLMNTLFF SEEKlNG TO USURP THE BOARD'S AUTHORlTY 
Because the claims asserted in a derivative action belong to the corporation, not to the 
shareholder individually, it is incumbent upon a shareholder plaintiff to make a demand upon the 
corporation's board of directors before commencing an action. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & 
.Ienretle, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004); Langer v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 264-65 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The board of directors' central role in managing the affairs of the corporation is 
a fundamental principle of corporate governance, and the demand requirement is an essential part 
of this principle, designed to protect the board's control over corporate affairs and prevent the 
wasting of judicial and corporate resources in the "quixotic pursuit of a purported corporate claim 
based solely on conclusions, opinions, or speculation." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,255 (Del. 
2000). Demand gives the board the opportunity to evaluate the claims and decide for itself 
whether corporate resources should be expended pursuing them. Recognizing the potential for 
misuse of the derivative action, some states, such as Idaho, require that a shareholder make a 
demand on the board of directors in every case, without exception, in order to ensure that the board 
maintains the ability to control the corporation's legal pursuits. See Idaho Code 30-1-742; 
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 234 (2002). Other states, such as Delaware, allow for a 
limited exception to the absolute demand requirement and permit shareholders to bypass the board 
only in the rare case where demand would be futile because a majority of the directors cannot be 
expected to fulfill their presumed role and respond based on the corporation's best interests. 
Accordingly, a would-be derivative plaintiff who fails to make a pre-suit demand - like Mr. 
Orrock - "must meet the 'heavy burden"' of establishing that demand should be excused because it 
would be htile. In re Interpublic Sec. Litig., No. 6527, 2004 WL 2397190, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
26, 2004) (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 551 (Del. 2001)). Futility means that "the 
directors are incapable of making an impartial decisioil regarding such litigation." Rules v 
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993). Thus, Mr. Orrock bears the burden of creating "a 
reasonable doubt that. . . the board of directors could have properly exercised its independent and 
disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand." Id at 933-34. See also Guttman v 
Huang, 823 A.2d 492,499-502 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
Despite the fact that the District Court twice dismissed his complaints for failing to satisfy 
these rigorous pleading requirements, Mr. Orrock remarkably asserts that this "is not a difficult 
burden for Plaintiff to meet." Brief at 8 n.2. He is plainly mistaken. The requirement that a 
plaintiff establish a "reasonable doubt" as to director disinterestedness or independence is not, as 
Citations to the Appellant's Brief will be in the form "Brief at -." 
Mr. Orrock suggests, a low hurdle. As the District Court correctly recognized, it is a demanding 
requirement that "stems from the well-settled principle that directors, rather than the shareholders, 
manage the affairs of the corporation, and that the decision of whether or not to bring a lawsuit is 
one for the directors." R. Vol. 11, pp. 405-406 (citing cases). 
To protect against shareholders seeking to usurp the board's authority, Delaware law 
mandates that derivative complaints "must comply with the stringent requirements of factual 
particularity that differ substantially from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by 
Chancery Rule 8(a)." Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254. Conclusory factual or legal allegations are 
insufficient. Indeed, it is a "critical requirement ... that the complaint must allege with particularity 
the reasons for demand excusal," and "[a] prolix complaint larded with conclusory language does 
not comply with these fundamental pleading mandates." Rattner v. Bidzos, No. 19700, 2003 WL 
22284323, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2003) (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254). Accordingly, courts 
routinely reject conclusory allegations when evaluating demand futility.3 
Directors are presumed to act in the best interests of the corporation - disinterested and 
independent of other influences - absent specific factual pleading by the plaintiff. See Beam ex rel. 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Del. 2004); Aronson 
V .  Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
3 See, e.g., In re Coca-Cola Enterprise, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 1927,2007 WL 3122370, 
at *2 n.14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2007) (court "does not accept the truthfulness of conclusory 
allegations"); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) ("conclusionary allegations of fact 
or law not supported by allegations of specific facts may not be taken as true"), overruled on other 
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
244 (Del. 2000); Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545, 2006 WL 1388744, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 9, 
2006) ("directors are entitled to a presumption that they were faithful to their duties"). "[Tlhe 
stockholder plaintiff must overcome the powerhl presumptions of the business judgment rule by 
alleging suficient particularized facts to support an inference that demand is excused because the 
board is incapable of exercising its power and authority to pursue the derivative claims directly." 
White, 783 A.2d at 551 (citations omitted). As such, "[pllaintiff s pleading burden ... is [I more 
onerous than that required to withstand [an ordinary] motion to dismiss." Levine v. Smith, 591 
A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000). 
Specifically, to satisfy this heavy burden the complaint must contain "particularized 
[factual] allegations" sufficient to "create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint was 
filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised its [I] independent and [2] disinterested 
business judgment in responding to a demand." Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. 
Ch. 1995) (citation omitted). In this appeal, Mr. Orrock has abandoned his argument that any 
directors are not independent, focusing only on the contention that certain directors are not 
sufficiently disinterested. Brief at 6-23. Even when the directors who would evaluate a demand 
are themselves named as defendants in the derivative action, the law imposes an exacting standard 
to prevent a plaintiff from casually naming the directors as defendants to avoid the demand 
requirement: to plead a disqualifying interest, a plaintiff must set forth particularized facts 
establishing that the "potential for [the directors'] liability is not 'a mere threat' but instead may rise 
to 'a substantial likelihood."' Rules, 634 A.2d at 936 (emphasis added) (quoting Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 815). A substantial likelihood of liability exists only in "rare cases" in which the 
challenged action or inaction is "egregious on its face." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815; see also In re 
Bavter Int' I, Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1271 @el. Ch. 1995) (dismissing complaint 
where court could not "conclude from the face of the complaint that this is a rare case where the 
circumstances are so egregious that there is a substantial likelihood of liability"). Additionally, 
where a specific board decision is challenged, a plaintiff may assert particularized factual 
allegations establishing that the challenged transaction was not the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 8 14. 
Thus, to establish demand futility here, Mr. Orrock must have alleged with particularity 
facts that rebut these powerfit1 presumptions under Delaware law and demonstrate that, at the time 
the complaint was filed, at least five out of nine Directors had engaged in such egregious conduct 
that they face a substantial likelihood of liability and thus could not have properly evaluated a 
demand. As the District Court correctly determined, Mr. Orrock failed to satisfy these onerous 
pleading requirements. 
111. M R  ORROCK HAS NOT PLEADED PARTICULARIZED FACTS SHOWING 
THAT A MAJORITY OF MICRON'S BOARD HAD A DISABLING INTEREST 
Mr. Orrock contends that Micron's Board could not properly consider a demand because a 
majority of the directors are subject to a substantial likelihood of liability for purportedly (1)  
consciously ignoring so-called "red flags" alerting them to price-fixing activity at Micron prior to 
the issuance of the DOJ subpoena; (2) failing to take action after the DOJ subpoena issued; and (3) 
consciously failing to oversee Micron's operations in general. However, as detailed below, the 
District Court correctly found that "the facts, as pled, do not suggest that the Board should have 
been aware of the problems or that they should have acted to stop further damage to the 
corporation sooner." R. Vol. 11, p. 224. 
A. The Complaint Lacks Particularized Facts Suggesting That Micron's 
Directors Knew Of Or Consciously Ignored Price-Fixing Activity Prior To The 
DOJ Subpoena 
Mr. Orrock attempts to impute pre-subpoena knowledge of price-fixing activity to 
Micron's directors based on several tenuous theories, none of which is sufficient to satisfy his 
heavy burden of "alleg[ing] facts demonstrating that the directors were actually aware of known 
violations, yet took no steps to prevent or remedy the situation." Brief at 10, citing In re Abbot 
t h .  Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 806 (7 Clr. 2003). In fact, to the extent Mr. 
Orrock seeks to impute knowledge to Micron's directors that they did not actually possess, his 
efforts are admittedly in vain, as Mr. Orrock himself concedes that the directors must have been 
"actually aware of known violations" before there could be a substantial threat of liability. Id. 
(emphasis altered). Moreover, it defies logic to claim that a director could consciously disregard 
knowledge that he or she didnot acfuallypossess. As such, Mr. Orrock's theories of constructive 
knowledge do not support his claim of demand htility. 
1. The Significance Of DRAM To Micron's Business Does Not Suggest 
That Micron's Directors Knew About Price-Fixing Activity 
Mr. Orrock first invites the Court to impute knowledge to the directors because DRAM 
sales represented a large part of Micron's business. Brief at 10-12. He contends that, due to the 
importance of DRAM sales, it is "reasonable to infer that the Board was thus aware of at least 
major developments in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips, including Micron's 
communications with other major DRAM manufacturers." Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added). This 
theory is flawed 
The sole derivative case relied on by Mr. Orrock in support of his imputation t h e ~ r y , ~  In re 
Biopure Corp. Derivative Lilig, 424 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. Mass. 2006), is inconsistent with 
Delaware's requirement that he allege facts showing a director's conscious or knowing disregard 
of his or her duties. Thus, it is not surprising that Biopure has not been adopted or incorporated 
by the Delaware courts. See Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d 831, 851 (Tex. App. 2008) 
(rejecting Biopure as not controlling; court "unable to find a Delaware case incorporating or 
adopting ... Biopure"; noting Delaware's requirement to plead particularized facts showing 
actual knowledge). 
In fact, the identical argument advanced by Mr. Orrock was soundly rejected in In re 
Forest Laboratories, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 450 F. Supp. 2d 379,390 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). There, 
plaintiffs sought to impute to the outside directors knowledge regarding the efficacy of certain 
drugs that accounted for up to 82% of the company's sales. The court held that, 
[wlhile it is true that (in the securities fraud context) knowledge of facts critical to 
the continued viability of major transactions or "core" business operations have 
been imputed to a company and its "key" or "top" oflcers ..., there is no 
authority to support the attribution of knowledge to Outside Directors who 
are not alleged to be directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the 
company. 
4 See Brief at 10-12. 
Id. at 390-91 (emphasis added, citations ~mit ted) .~ 
In so holding, the court explicitly distinguished Biopure, where the court imputed 
"knowledge of information putting 'a company's primary product or service ... in jeopardy." 
Forest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (quoting Biopure Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 308). Because there 
were no allegations of potentially "catastrophic consequences for Forest's primary sources of 
revenue" or that the company's primary product was "in jeopardy," the case fell "outside the 
scope of constructive knowledge cases upon which plaintiffs rely." Id. at 393. 
The same is true here, and it is for that reason that Mr. Orrock's attempts to distinguish 
Forrest are misplaced. Like Forrest, and unlike Biopure, the Third Amended Complaint lacks 
particularized factual allegations of potentially "catastrophic consequences" for Micron's DRAM 
business. While it does allege competition between DRAM and RDRAM between 1996 and 1999 
(R. Vol. 11, pp. 302-305, 77 47-58), that was years before the "Relevant Period" defined by the 
Complaint as beginning in February 2001 (id at p. 286,Y 1). Moreover, such competition hardly 
indicates that Micron's business was in jeopardy at all, let alone in 2001 or later. 
Further, the knowledge the plaintiffs sought to impute to the directors of Forrest and 
Biopure was that each company's key product was having problems. That is not what Mr. Orrock 
seeks to impute to Micron's outside directors. Rather, his imputation theory is much more 
attenuated, and lacks logical or factual support - that since Micron's directors were aware of 
The court found it "unsurprising, then, that none of the Outside Directors are named as 
defendants in the related securities class action complaint." 450 F. Supp. 2d at 391 n.12. The 
same is true here. 
competition with its DRAM product they should also be deemed to have known that Micron would 
respond to the competition by engaging in price-fixing activity. Brief at 10-12. The directors had 
no reason to suspect that Micron employees would engage in such actions to address a routine 
business challenge. Indeed, "absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor 
senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees 
and the honesty of their dealings on the company's behalf.'' Stone v. Ritter, 91 1 A.2d 362, 368 
(Del. 2006) (quoting In re Caremark Int 'I,  Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959,969 @el. Ch. 1996)). 
Lacking the necessary support, Mr. Orrock goes so far as to misstate the criteria for 
imputation espoused in Biopure, seeking an "infer[ence] that the Board was thus aware of at least 
major developments in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips, including Micron's 
communications with other major DRAM manufacturers." Brief at 11-12 (emphasis added). Yet 
his allegations fail even to satisfy this erroneous framework. The Third Amended Complaint 
contains no basis for the conclusory - and patently incorrect - assertion that price-fixing activity 
was a "major development[] in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips" ( i d )  as opposed to 
isolated activity engaged in by some employees. In fact, to the contrary, the Third Amended 
Complaint acknowledges Micron's statement that it "deplores any effort to fix or stabilize prices 
and is committed to rectifying past behavior and ensuring that any misconduct will not recur." R. 
Val. 11, p. 3 16,195. Accordingly, the Court should not impute knowledge of price-fixing activity 
to Micron's eight outside directors.' 
2. The Purported "Red Flags" Are Insufficient To Put The Directors On 
Notice That Micron Was Violating The Law 
Mr. Orrock further contends that Micron's Board is subject to a substantial likelihood of 
liability because they "consciously ignored numerous red flags that would have alerted them to 
Micron's role in the price-fixing conspiracy and took no action to ensure that the Company's best 
interests were being protected." Brief at 1. The purported "red flags" consist of certain news 
articles published between 2000 and 2002 in various publications around the world. Id. at 12. Mr. 
Orrock recognizes, however, that in order to meet his pleading burden, he must allege specific 
"facts demonstrating that the directors were actually aware of known violations, yet took no steps 
to prevent or remedy the situation." Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (citing Abbott Labs, 325 F.3d at 
806). Mr. Orrock has not come close to satisfying this exacting standard, as the articles he cites are 
woefully insufficient to constitute "notice of serious misconduct" at Micron. David B. Shaev Projf 
Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No. 1449,2006 WL 391931, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13), af fd  mem., 
91 1 A.2d 802 (Del. 2006) (plaintiff must allege facts showing that "the directors were conscious of 
' In a variation on this refrain, Mr. Orrock also argues that Micron's Board should have been 
on notice of price-fixing activity because Micron cut its supply of DRAM by 20% over the course 
of seven months and because DRAM prices subsequently rose in early 2002. Brief at 15. Even if 
true, there is nothing unusual about a reduction in supply and consequent increase in price; this 
basic economic principle is implemented every day by businesses of all varieties and sizes. There 
would be no reason for any Board member to think that this routine manifestation of supply and 
demand must be the result of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy. 
the fact that they were not doing their jobs and that they ignored red flags indicating misconduct in 
defiance of their duties"). 
The November, 2000 CNN Monev Article. Mr. Orrock contends an article claiming that 
manufacturers "dragged their feet in RDRAM production, keeping the prices high and uptake 
slow," somehow put the Directors on notice of Micron's role in an alleged price-fixing 
conspiracy.7 R. Val. 11, p. 306, 7 62; Brief at 12. However, the article's only reference to 
Micron is to note that Micron had sued Rambus for collecting dues on unenforceable patents. R. 
Val. 11, p. 306, 7 62. The article does not mention collusion between any manufacturers, let 
alone suggest that Micron was involved in price-fixing activity. Id. 
The August, 2001 Silicon Strateaies Article. According to this article, certain 
unidentified "DRAM manufacturers met to discuss measures that could be taken to halt 'the 
downward spiral of DRAM prices."' R. Val. 11, p. 307,T 67; Brief at 12. Yet Mr. Orrock does 
not allege any facts suggesting that Micron participated in the meetings, nor does he allege any 
reason why Micron's Board should suspect Micron's involvement. Id 
The November, 2001 Articles. Two articles published in November 2001 commented 
that analysts did not know why DRAM prices were rising. R. Val. 11, p. 308, 7 69; Brief at 12. 
Mr. Orrock does not allege that the articles even mention Micron, let alone allege collusion 
between Micron and other DRAM suppliers. Nor does he offer any facts explaining why 
It is important to note that the DOJ investigation concerned pricing for DRAM, not RDRAM, 
which is a different memory technology and product that Micron never sold. R. Val. 11, p. 288 - 
289,77 7-1 3. 
Micron's Board should have assumed that DRAM price increases were the result of wrongful 
conduct, as opposed to the myriad market forces that routinely impact prices. Mr. Orrock 
certainly fails to allege facts sufficient to put the Board on notice that, if there was a price fixing 
conspiracy, Micron was somehow involved. Id. 
The May 2002 Articles. In May 2002, the Detroit News and Taipei Times reported that a 
Taiwanese chip maker had agreed with other unnamed manufacturers to restrict DRAM sales in 
order to boost prices. R. Vol. 11, p. 309,y 72; Brief at 12. Again, there is no mention of Micron, 
nor are any facts alleged suggesting that Micron may have been involved in the purported 
conspiracy. Id. 
In sum, Mr. Orrock has not pleaded the requisite "red flags" to establish a substantial 
likelihood of liability arising from the conscious disregard of known violations. He points to a 
handful of articles published over the span of two years, but none even mentions Micron in 
connection with alleged price-fixing activity, let alone constitute notice to the Board that Micron 
employees were engaged in price-fixing activity. Mr. Orrock argues that the fact that none of the 
articles "mention Micron is of no consequence" because they "refer to potential price-fixing 
among the DRAM manufacturers[.]" Brief at 13-14 (emphasis added). But, even in the 
aggregate, the articles do not suggest that Micron was engaged in wrongful conduct. A 
smattering of articles over several years "hint[ing]" at "potential" wrongdoing by other DRAM 
manufacturers does not imply that Micron was involved in misconduct, and certainly does not 
establish that the Board was "actually aware of known violations" yet "consciously disregard[ed] 
a known duty." Brief at 12-13. Mr. Onock's "red flag" allegations thus fall far short of pleading 
a substantial likelihood of liability for any of Micron's directors. See, e.g. Ash v. McCall, No. 
17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *4, 15-16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) (granting dismissal despite 
alleged "red flags," including published articles and reports questioning HBOC's accounting 
practices); Spear v. Conway, No. 401919/03, 2003 WL 240121 18, at *2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Oct. 17, 
2003) (granting dismissal despite alleged "red flags," including public criticism by then SEC 
Chairperson Levitt). 
Moreover, aside from the fact that the content of the articles is insufficient to put the 
Directors on notice of any wrongdoing, Mr. Orrock fails to allege facts suggesting that any Board 
members ever read the cited articles. Further, the Third Amended Complaint cites no notes, 
reports, memos, "or board meeting minutes reflecting conversations from which the Court may 
infer that the [I Directors had actual knowledge of [the purported red flags] or any other alleged 
inside information." Forest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 390. See also Guttman, 823 A.2d at 503 
("Entirely absent from the complaint are well-pled, particularized allegations of fact detailing the 
precise roles that these directors played at the company, the information that would have come to 
their attention in those roles, and any indication as to why they would have perceived the [alleged 
problems]"). The absence of facts establishing Board awareness of the purported "red flags" is 
fatal to Mr. Orrock's attempt to establish director interest. Forrest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 396 
(demand futility allegations inadequate where "[tlhere is nothing in the Amended Complaint to 
suggest or permit the court to infer that any of the alleged 'red flags' ever came to the attention of 
the board of directors or any committee of the board.") (quoting In re Citigroup, Inc Shareholders 
Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 5), a f d  mem., 839 A.2d 666 @el. 
3. Allegations Regarding Mr. Sadler's October 2001 Trip Are Inadequate 
To Establish A Disabling Interest 
Allegations of a secret trip by Mr. Sadler in October 2001 do not expose Micron's outside 
directors to a substantial likelihood of liability. Mr. Orrock alleges that Mr. Sadler traveled to 
Europe and Asia in October 2001 "to meet with other CEOs to determine whether some of the 
other DRAM manufacturers would be cutting DRAM production." R. Vol. 11, p. 307, 7 65. 
According to the Third Amended Complaint, Mr. "Appleton was aware of defendant Sadler's 
October 2001 trip and the purpose behind it" and "himself planned to fly to Munich to meet with 
secretly with Infineon and the Samsung CEO about cutting back DRAM production." Id.., 7 66. 
Mr. Orrock goes on to argue that "it is reasonable to infer that information regarding the 
Company's role in the conspiracy was shared with fellow directors Bagley, Lothrop, Smith and 
Webber at various meetings of the Board and committees thereof." R. Vol. 11, p. 323,l  107(b). 
These wholly conclusory allegations add nothing to Mr. Orrock's demand futility 
argument. As an initial matter, the Third Amended Complaint contains no facts to support the 
claim that Mr. Appleton knew about the trip's purportedly improper purpose. While Mr. Orrock's 
Appellate Brief cites to recent testimony in another litigation (Brief at 14), those allegations are not 
included in the Third Amended Complaint and thus have no bearing on the adequacy of that 
pleading. 
Even if Mr. Appleton was aware of misconduct, however, Mr. Orrock's proposed inference 
that Mr. Appleton must have told the outside directors about the alleged misconduct is comple.tely 
devoid of factual support. The Third Amended Complaint leaves critical questions unanswered, 
such as how and when did Mr. Appleton supposedly communicate the information to the other 
Board members, and what information did he communicate? Mr. Orrock offers no facts 
whatsoever regarding any specific documents, conversations, meetings or reports from which the 
directors are alleged to have learned of the purported misconduct. See Ratfner, 2003 WL 
22284323, at *10 n.53 (rejecting conclusory allegations of directors' knowledge of wrongdoing 
that "fail[ed] to allege with particularity what information the directors knew and how they 
acquired such knowledge"). 
Nor does Mr. Orrock's generic reference to "assum[ed but unspecified] proper govemance 
procedures" fill the gap or provide any support for an inference that the directors were aware of 
misconduct. Brief at 15. Abbott, upon which Mr. Orrock relies for this proposition, does not hold 
otherwise. There, the FDA sent a number of warning letters to company executives, including the 
Chairman of the Board, detailing multiple violations it had uncovered relating to the company's 
products. Abbott, 325 F.3d at 799-800. Further, the "FDA's problems with Abbott were public 
knowledge." Id. at 806. The Court held that "[ulnder proper governance procedures ... 
information of the violations would have been shared at the board meetings." Id. Here, by 
contrast, Mr. Orrock alleges a secret "conspiracy" among DRAM manufacturers (Brief at 15) that 
would plainly not be the subject of Board discussion under the governance procedures that Mr. 
Orrock assumes exist but does not describe. Indeed, as the District Court correctly recognized, 
"[c]ommon sense dictates that a director engaged in wrongdoing himself would not reveal this to 
other directors, and thus it is improper to impute knowledge to the entire Board in a situation such 
as this." R. Vol. 11, p. 409. Thus, Mr. Orrock's unsupported assertions of director knowledge are 
plainly insufficient. See, e.g. Rattner, 2003 WL 22284323, at *lo, 11 (rejecting allegations 
"without any particularized facts, that the Director Defendants knew of inside information"). 
Mr. Orrock has thus failed to plead particularized facts showing that, before the DOJ 
subpoena issued, the Directors were actually aware of price-fixing activity or that such knowledge 
could be imputed to them. Further, it goes without saying that a director cannot address or ignore 
something he does not actually know about. Thus, absent any actval knowlcdgc of the purported 
"red flags," it is impossible to consciously disregard them. Not surprisingly, then, Mr. Orrock 
fails to "point to facts suggesting a conscious decision to take no action in response to red flags. 
Without these well-pleaded allegations, there is no possibility the defendants faced a substantial 
likelihood of liability." Forest, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (quoting Stone v Ritter, No. 1570, 2006 
WL 302558, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26), aff'd, 91 1 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)). 
B. Micron's Directors Responded Promptly To The DOJ Subpoena And Do Not 
Face A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability For Their Post-Subpoena Conduct 
Unable to plead particularized facts sufficient to show that Micron's Board knew of, yet 
consciously and wrongfully disregarded, price-fixing activity by Micron's employees before 
accusations of misconduct became public, Mr. O ~ ~ o c k  was forced to shift his theory of demand 
futility in his Third Amended Complaint. He argues that the Director Defendants "were aware at 
least as of June 2002 that Micron was likely involved in the DRAM price fixing conspiracy" based 
on the many news articles that were published following Micron's disclosure of the DO3 subpoena. 
R. Vol. 11, pp. 323-324,n 107(c). Mr. Orrock hrther alleges that, "[dlespite the investigation and 
related news articles, Micron's Board took no action to determine the role of Micron and its 
employees in the conspiracy ... [and] utterly failed to take any affirmative steps to uncover the true 
facts regarding Micron's participation in the wrongdoing alleged herein." Id. Based on these 
allegations, Mr. Orrock claims that there is a substantial likelihood of liability on the part of a 
majority of the Board and, thus, that demand on the director defendants would have been futile. 
There are several problems with this theory. 
First and foremost, the theory is based on an erroneous premise. Mr. Orrock's contention 
that Micron's Board "took no action" following the issuance of the DOJ subpoena is patently 
wrong. In fact, it is contradicted by the very allegations of the Third Amended Complaint, which 
quotes multiple reports that Micron was cooperating "fully and actively" with the DOJ, including 
providing the DOJ with evidence relating to the alleged price-fixing activity. R Vol. 11, pp. 314- 
3 19,yy 94 - 96, 98, 99. It goes without saying that, to actively cooperate with the investigation 
and provide the DOJ with evidence, Micron must have undeaaken an investigation of its own to 
find such evidence. Additionally, the Third Amended Complaint concedes that the Board's actions 
sewed to benefit Micron: in exchange for Micron's full, continuing and complete cooperation in 
the DOJ investigation, Micron would not be subject to prosecution, fines, or other penalties. Id. 
To qualify for such treatment, the DOJ requires, among other things, that the corporation take 
"prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity." Ex. C at 1, 3. Fnrther, the 
Complaint acknowledges Micron's representation that it is committed to going beyond "rectifying 
past behavior" and has taken steps to "ensur[e] [that] any misconduct will not recur." R. Vol. 11, p. 
316, 7 95. Micron's efforts include the implementation of "strong governance practices and 
comprehensive compliance programs." Id. Thus, the theory that Micron's Board took no action in 
response to allegations of price-fixing activity is belied by the allegations of the Complaint, is 
plainly wrong, and does not support a substantial likelihood of liability. 
Undaunted by the facts alleged in his own complaint, Mr. Orrock remarkably claims that 
the Board failed to act, with "no Board investigation, no committee charged with conducting an 
investigation, no interviews with Micron employees or other representatives[.]" Brief at 18. This 
allegation is based solely on the fact that Mr. Orrock is unaware of any such action because he was 
"unable to find anything" after "conduct[ing] his own investigation." Id. But Mr. Orrock did not 
enlighten the Court as to the details of his "investigation," which may have consisted of nothing 
more than scanning some newspapers and the internet. Mr. Orrock surely did not make a books 
and records request to Micron, and there is nothing in the Third Amended Complaint to suggest 
that he spoke to Micron insiders regarding the Board's response to the allegations of price-fixing 
activity. Accordingly, there is no reason Mr. Orrock would be privy to information about an 
internal investigation conducted by Micron and its independent outside counsel. He would not 
have access to any interview notes, memos, or findings of Micron's investigation. But Mr. 
Orrock's ignorance is by no means proof that the Company did not act quickly and appropriately in 
response to the allegations of misconduct. Nor is his argument that "Defendants presumably 
would have brought any other actions taken on behalf of Micron to the District Court's 
attention[.]" Brief at 18. In briefing their motions to dismiss, defendants are limited to relying on 
documents referenced in the pleadings or subject to judicial notice. Consequently, board minutes 
and other documents discussing the Board's response to the allegations of price-fixing fall outside 
the scope of the briefing. Micron's adherence to the rules of civil procedure should not be seen as 
evidence that its Board failed to act appropriately. When construed against the contradictory 
evidence referenced in the Complaint - that Micron promptly acted by, among other things, 
investigating the claims, identifying evidence, and producing the evidence to the DOJ, thereby 
obtaining amnesty - Mr. Orrock's bare assertion that he could not find signs of any action taken by 
the Board should be d i~re~arded .~  
Faced with such indisputable evidence of Micron's prompt and effective actions, Mr. 
Orrock belittles the Board's efforts, arguing that "merely" cooperating with the DOJ, thereby 
avoiding millions of dollars in fines, is somehow not enough. Brief at 17. According to Mr. 
Orrock, Micron has been forced to bear the costs of the litigation associated with the alleged price- 
fixing activity, and defendants could have somehow prevented that harm had they "actively and 
thoroughly investigated the wrongdoing with an eye toward the best interests of Micron[.]" Id. at 
18. However, the barrage of litigation against Micron began shortly after the DOJ subpoena 
brought the issue to the attention of the Board and the public (see R. Vol. 11, p. 292, 7 20), and 
there is no allegation that the misconduct continued after that point. Once the subpoena issued, 
there was nothing the Board could have done to prevent the litigation that was sure to follow. 
Mr. Orrock's reliance on dicta in Conradv. Blank 940 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 2007), is 
misplaced. In Conrad, the court commented on the company's failure to divulge details regarding 
its investigation and remedial measures, musing that "it would be odd if Delaware law required a 
stockholder to make a demand" in that situation. Id. at 38. The court, however, made clear that 
such remarks were not part of its demand htility analysis. Id. at 37 (comments were made 
"[blefore analyzing [the] issue" of demand futility). Mr. Orrock concedes as much, but insists that 
the dicta "provides significant guidance on the question of demand futility[.]" Brief at 19. It does 
* Mr. Orrock cites in a footnote Mr. Smith's interview with the Idaho Statesman in an attempt 
to bolster his contention that the Board consciously refused to act. Brief at 20-21, n.6. The 
interview does not provide the missing support, as Mr. Smith said nothing at all about the Board's 
awareness of or response to the price-fixing activities alleged here. Ex. B. 
not. Instead, Mr. Orrock's spin on the Conrad dicta is merely a variation on the theory, "if they 
were inclined to sue, they would have done so before now," which Delaware courts reject as 
"hav[mg] no basis in fact and in law." Richardson v. Graves, No. 6617, 1983 WL 21 109, at *3 
(Del. Ch. June 17, 1983).~ "The mere fact that they have not elected to sue before the derivative 
action was filed should not of itself indicate 'interestedness.' As a matter of fact, it is the Board's 
inaction in most every case which is the raison d'etre for Rule 23.1." Id A board of directors has 
wide latitude under the business judgment rule to respond lo potential misconduct in a manner it 
believes is in the company's best interests. Indeed, if Mr. Orrock had made a demand on Micron's 
Board in this case, the Board's response would be afforded deference under the business judgment 
rule. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981). Mr. Orrock admittedly does not know what the Board did 
when it learned of the price-fixing activity (aside from obtaining amnesty and avoiding millions of 
dollars in fines and penalties), and his uninformed opinion is inadequate to overcome the strong 
presumptions of the business judgment rule. The directors are thus not subject to a substantial 
likelihood of liability for their post-DOJ subpoena actions. 
C. Micron's Directors Do Not Face A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability For 
Allegedly Failing To Monitor Or Oversee Micron's Operations 
Mr. Orrock's final argument (Brief at 21-23) is based on the "CaremarlZ' theory of liability 
for failure of oversight. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
However, his failure to establish a substantial likelihood of director liability based on any of his 
other theories forecloses the possibility of success on his Caremark claim, which is recognized 
See also Blasbandv. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1052 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] board's failure to take 
action, even if it is aware of wrongdoing, does not demonstrate futility") (citing cases). 
as "possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to 
win a judgment." Id. at 967. Caremark requires that a plaintiff adequately allege that the 
directors knew or should have known that violations of law were occurring, and that the directors 
took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy the situation. Id at 971. Mr. Orrock must 
allege that the Board "utterly fail[ed] to exercise oversight of the corporation." Armstrong, 2006 
WL 391931, at *5. But it is not enough for him to allege that the directors should have done a 
better job. Rather, the "imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that 
they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations." Stone, 91 1 A.2d at 370 (emphasis added). 
Yet, as detailed at length above, the Tbird Amended Complaint lacks the facts necessary to satisfy 
this difficult standard. Mr. Orrock has not alleged any particularized facts to establish that 
Micron's directors had actual knowledge of price-fixing activity prior to the issuance of the DOJ 
subpoena, nor has he alleged facts warranting the imposition of constructive knowledge on the 
Board. Moreover, the Board could not have acted on or consciously disregarded information they 
did not possess. 
Mr. Orrock's reliance on Ash v. McCall, No. 17132,2000 W L  1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 
2000), as the only authority in support of his Caremark claim is puzzling given that the Court in 
Ash dismissed Caremark claims premised on "red flags" much more salient than those alleged 
here. In Ash, the "red flags" alleged to have alerted the board to accounting inegularities 
included a Bloomberg article and two reports published by the Center for Financial Research & 
Analysis criticizing and questioning the company's accounting practices. Id. at *4. Moreover, 
one of the reports "garnered a fair amount of media attention, was the focus of much analyst 
commentary, and appeared to have some impact, albeit brief, on HBOC's share price." Id. at *15. 
Although "[tlhese facts indicate that HBOC, at some organizational level, knew of and 
responded to public criticism of its accounting practices" the court held that "Plaintiffs have not, 
however, alleged facts that HBOC's directors had actual knowledge of these events and, 
therefore, possessed actual knowledge of potential accounting irregularities." Id. Nor did the 
board have constructive knowledge, even thought the Company's public relations department 
actually responded to the report. Id. 
While the court did leave open the hypothetical possibility that demand could be excused 
if plaintiffs "allege[d] particularized facts that might enable this Court to infer that HBOC 
directors ... did possess knowledge of facts suggesting accounting improprieties ... and took no 
action to respond to them" (id.), demand was not excused in Ash and it should not be excused 
here, where the purported "red flags" pale in comparison to those rejected by the Ash court 
Unlike the prominent articles and reports directly challenging company-specific practices in Ash, 
the purported "red flags" here are nothing more than a smattering of articles published in various 
markets around the world that did not even mention Micron by name, let alone accuse it of 
participating in price-fixing activity. Lacking particularized facts establishing director 
knowledge and conscious disregard of price-fixing activity, Mr. Orrock's Caremark claims fail 
to raise a substantial likelihood of liability. Accordingly, demand is not excused and Mr. Orrock 
lacks standing to pursue claims in behalf of Micron. 
IV. MR. ORROCK'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 23(F) PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT GROUND FOR 
AFFIRMING DISMISSAL 
Wholly separate from the issue of demand htility, the Third Amended Complaint is also 
defective because it, like its predecessors, fails to satisfy the continuous ownership requirement of 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Tlis failure provides an independent ground for affirming the 
District Court's dismissal. Hanf v Syringa Realty Co., 120 Idaho 364, 370 (1991) ("Our prior 
cases have held that we will uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be 
found to support it") (citing Foremost Ins Co. v Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 144-45 (1981); 
Anderson & Nafiiger v G.T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179 (1979)). 
Rule 23(f) requires Mr. Orrock to allege that he "was a shareholder or member at the time 
of the transaction of which [he] complains[.]" Idaho Civ. Proc. Code 5 23(f). To satisfy the rule, 
he must "indicate when [he] bought stock.. . and [he] must state that [he has] owned stock 
continuously[.]" In re Sagent Tech., Inc Deriv. Litig., 278 F.  Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (interpreting the exact same language in Rule 23.1).'~ While this is not a difficult task, 
compliance is strictly enforced." 
'O See also In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc. See. Litig, No. 2297,2004 WL 2397586, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff had failed to specifically plead 
that the dates of his stock ownership were contemporaneous with relevant period of alleged fraud). 
" See, eg. In re New Valley Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 17649, 2004 WL 1700530, at *3 
@el. Ch. June 28,2004) (holding Delaware's similar "continuous ownership" requirement "has 
become a bedrock tenet of Delaware law and is adhered to closely"); Desimone v Barrows, 924 
A.2d 908, 927 (Del. Ch. 2007) (strictly applying continuous ownership requirement and 
dismissing claims predating stockholder's stock ownership); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 359 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (same). 
Here, however, despite having several opportunities, Mr. Orrock inexplicably refuses to 
reveal the details of his purported ownership of Micron stock. He has not even alleged that he 
owned stock "continuously" during the Relevant Period. Instead, he simply claims that he "is and 
was an owner of the stock of Micron during times relevant . . . and remains a shareholder of the 
Company." R. Vol. 11, p. 321,lj 106. One of the key reasons for the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement is "to curtail shike suits by prohibiting potential plaintiffs from buying into a lawsuit 
by purchasing stock in a corporation after the alleged wrong has occurred." Blasband v Rales, 
772 F. Supp. 850, 858 (D. Del. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citation omitted). Yet Mr. Orrock's vague representation that he owned Micron stock "during 
times relevant" fails to address this important concern and does nothing to dispel the possibility 
that he "bought a lawsuit" by purchasing Micron stock well after the alleged price-fixing activity 
became the subject of national attention (and several other lawsuits). Notably, Mr. Orrock does not 
claim that he owned Micron stock "during all times relevant," but just during "times relevant" to 
the purported wrongs. R. Vol. 11, p. 293, 7 21. Coupled with his expansive definition of the 
"Relevant Period" as running from Februaw 2001 through the present (R. Vol. 11, p. 287, I), Mr. 
Orrock could have purchased his shares mere moments before filing suit and sold it moments later. 
There is nothing in the Third Amended Complaint to suggest otherwise. 
If Mr. Orrock's essentially meaningless representation of stock ownership "during times 
relevant" is deemed sufficient, it would eviscerate the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f) and leave its important policy interests unfulfilled. Given the negligible burden of 
pleading specific dates of stock ownership, such a result is clearly not warranted. Accordingly, the 
Complaint is subject to dismissal for this independent reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Orrock's demand futility allegations fail if even one of the director defendants is 
capable of considering a demand. Yet the Third Amended Complaint lacks the particularized 
factual allegations necessary to disqualify any outside director. Additionally, Mr. Orrock's failure 
to satisfy the continuous ownership requirement of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23(0 provides an 
independent basis for dismissal. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Micron respectfully 
requests that the Cotut affirm the District Court's order granting Micron's motion to dismiss with 
prejudice. 
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! ldahoStatesman.com 
b 
[ a i i k  Here to PrM This Article I 
July 20,2007 
Dan Popkey's entire interview with Gordon Smith 
Question-and-answer with Micron Director Gordon Smith, who is calling for the removal of CEO Steve Appleton: 
Q: Can you address the anxieties about Micron's future i n  Idaho? 
A: Let me kind of preface this by telling you that I think there's a lot of things that needed to be changed, and the wmments that I'li make to 
you are my own. But I would say this: The board that we have now is wmpletely different than what you might exped wming from Boise, 
Idaho. It's made up primarily of people that are in the high-tech industfy, which isn't nacessarily bad. Blnthe problem is they wme frum large 
companies who have a wmpletely different wlture. They come from wmpanies that are probably used to making changes. How do I say 
thls? I wouldn't necessarily say getting rid of peopie when they have to, but they do. And it's something that Micron has, over the years, has 
never experienced. There have been layoffs, but nothing of the magnitude that we're talking now. 
This is probably the first cut, and I'm not saying that there'll be more, but certainly 1 would guess that what Steve (Appleton) has got In the 
back of his mind is tnere will be jobs that will be transfened -say they'll either be outsourced w they'll be bansferred to other countries. 
Some of these jobs the peopie may have a chance to keep the jobs they have, if they're willing to transfer. Very possibly to a foreign country, 
South-st Asia. That's kind of the hotbed for the tech industry. China. Singapore. Taipei. You know, all those places. That's kind of where this 
industry Is really focusing right now. You take China and India with all the people that they have, and yw know, they're very aggressive as far 
as trying to make their mark in the world with anything that relates to the high tech, wmputers and that sort of thing. 
Q: Will there be more layoffs? 
A: That I can't tell you for sure because I don't think anybody at Micron really knows. And I think they're trying to work themselves through this 
thing. What they're gonna have to do is get to a level where they can make money, they can lower their costs, and rlght now they're not there. 
Q: How did the decision to lay off workers occur7 
We'd naa several dlscLssons abobt tnis and $1 all k.nd of was precip;tated by the faa that wc werenl makng money. We were wncerned 
about shareholdor valLe and what wd!d oe done lo correct it. And. obvlwsly, the trst place you look is whether or Mt we're wmpetit~ve in lhe 
world We weren't. So. yeah, the board expressed their mnceins aboJt thls several different times and finally the management group picked 
up the ball and started their own sessions about what wuld be done. They had wme back to the board with this plan ofwhere thev were 
gonna have to downsize, outsource and even move some jobs to other &unIsies. On the surface, to the board, itswnded like something that 
had to be done and might possibly be a solution. 
Q: Are you convinced this is the right solution? 
A: No, and I'll tell you what, and this is my own opinion, and I'm gonna kind of step out of line here just a little bit, but this board that we have 
now in my estimation is very passive. They all wme from big wmpanies. They've ail got Lheir own problems. And for them to turn around and 
get right into the middle of the Micron problems I think it'sa little more than what they want to take on. OK? Now thars my opinion. 
P: Are you saying the board is not involved as it should be? 
A: The board is not near as aggressive as they should be 
Q: What would you have liked to have seen different, in hlndslghl? 
A Th s goes way oack, but I could see thal the wlture of the company out lhere was changi ng.... l lnink ths goes back to about the t'me, just 
prior to, or let's say aboLl four, live years ago I wuld soe a real change wming on . .  The new d;rectors lhat came on and are on there noa. 
thevre really not famll;ar ~ i i h  what went on in the past. So, all they know is what they've seen snce they've been on the board. We lost (board 
member) Tom Nicholson We lost (board member) Bob Lothrop and it was just prior to those fellows ieaving that I muld see this change 
coming. 
Q: Are you saying the board just doesn't know enough? 
A: No, these guys that are on the board now, they're very knowledgeable about the industry. There's noquestion about that. They know the 
industry. They haven't had enough experience with Micron to, I think, really dig into this problem - because this is a problem that's been 
building for quite some time. 
Q: Are you saying the board went to management and said 'Look, we've got competitiveness problems, we naad to address them: 
and then management came back with this plan for redudion In force? 
A: Right. The board started expressing their wncerns, because we'd had a number of wnversations about the lack of shareholder value. We 
weren't making enough money, we weren't making money, our stock prices were way down from where they had been in prior years. And you 
know, it was a concern 
i l a i ~  Popkey's entire interview with Gordon Smith I Micron Technology ... http:llwww.idahostatesman.co&crodv-pstol12098.html 
Q: When was that first broached? 
A: Oh, golly. I'd say we first started talking about that several years ago. 
Q: Did management not act quickly enough? 
A Tn.s is the first real pos 1 ve step that the $llanayen!ent group has taker,. Now.. pricr lo hat, I Utirih they Uied sonle different stmtegic moves 
wnich. l'd have lo say a1 tne best, were lust mayoe barely successhi . .  Foe mmtanu?. we've kind of wt back on our DRAM production 
oecause thars a very mmpet,We pan of the business. Everybody's in it, everywdy can makea DRAM, but the key to it is you've got lo haw 
onto that DRAM business and that technology because it forms the basis for so many other things. We have an imaging group out 
there ... initially they were very successful, b;t as time goes on more and more other companies get into It, it becomes more competitive and if 
you'regoing to make any money, you've got to be the low-wst producer. 
Q: When did you lose the competitive edgdand why? 
A I'd sag we swrted loslng the compet8tlve odge five. SIX years ago We should have tanen a good look at what wo were domg, mu we wete 
oo~na 1t If we were !he hlqh cost producer or we were headad m that direction, maybe steps should have been taken then to uwnler that 
Q: Why weren't they? 
A: YOU can lay that on the management group, or you can lay it on the board, but somewhere. You know that's what you're there for. is to try 
to head those things off before they get started 
Q: Do you felt some regret and responsibility for thls? 
A: Well, I feel real bad about the whole situation and I think, here again, had the board been a little morb aggressive and maybe a little more 
inquiring, maybe we could have stopped some of this. But we didn't. 
Q: What's the future for Steve Appleton? What does i t  mean that he lost the title of president, and, are you confident in his 
leadership as CEO? 
A. Well, let me p.11 it this way For quite a long time. Steve has helo the tite of Chairman of tne Board. Chief Exewtlve Officer and Preslden!. 
That's too many t~lles too many jobs for one guy. tn a wmpany the size of Mlcron. You can't do i l And we\e had numerous discussions with 
Steve about me fact that he ought to give up some of those titles and bring, so to speak, h s  replacement on board. 
Q: So was this the board's decision to  give the presidency to  Mark Durcin? 
A: Mark is a very sharp guy, very technically oriented. Whether Mark is a money-maker I can't teti you. That's something that we need to really 
determine. 
Q: Is he your next CEO? 
A: Well, let's put it this way: He's in line for it. It doesn't necessarily mean that he'd be the CEO, but he's certainly the only guy out there right 
now that you'd look to if you're gonna look in-house. 
Q: Are you confident in Appleton's leadership as CEO g ~ e n  that you regret someof these costeuttlng moves didn't come sooneR 
A I'm one of seven, but I'm gonM say tnls Steve he's really a dedicated guy tle doesnl dnnk He doesn't SmoKe He works hard But I think 
as tar as running a company and maktng money, tnars not h s bag 
Q: Is there somethlng afoot here? Does the majority of the board feel that way? You sound like you're ready to make a change 
A: I'd be honest with you. I'd have made a change a long time ago. But I don't think the rest ofthe board is ready. 
Q: Have you tried to pemuade them of that? 
A: We've had diicussmns.,..Every time we have a board meeting we have what we call an executive session of the board excluding all Micron 
employees (meaning Appteton left the room) .... We talk about a lot of these problems among ourselves and then one member of the bmrd wili 
tell Steve what we discussed and what we recommend. 
Q: Have you suggested to  your colleagues on the board that it's time for Steve to  be replaced? 
A: Well. I'd say ME, we've had discussions about him giving up some of these duties and ... giving them to somebody else. In other words, 
lighten his load. We've done that with the presidency. 
Q: Are you saying you are not confident in Appleton remtning as CEO? 
A Welt. l'd put it to you lhls way I honestly thlnk it wodd be better for M~crort I we wuid k~nd of restructure the lop And I thlnk at th~s po.nt, 
Sleve's st111 a relattvely yourlg guy, and 11 mtght be better off for hlm to move on to somewhere else and give somebody else a chance. see 
what they can do 
i  an P~pkey's entire iotewiev, with Gordon Smith I Micron Technology ... hnp:lIwww.idahostatesman.com/microdv-p-I 12098.hhnl 
Q: Is that s case you\e made to the board? 
A: I haven't been very forceful about it. 
Q: Is that going to change? You're talking to a reporter about it - are you thinking it's time for you to be more aggressive? 
A There's no quesloc about me fact that the board needs to b m m e  more aggressive. We've nad some dlscuss:ons aDoul that in the past 
And to be honest with you. I can? tell you how the rest of the board members feel, bul I would suspect tnat the buld of them probably don't 
ha've too many feelings one way or another because they haven*! been involved iong enough to know. 
Q: Are you going to do anything about your feeling that it would be better for Appleton toflnd something else? 
A: The only thing i can do is express to the board how i feel. And if the board doesn't want togo along with that, then nothing wiil happen. If 
they feel tike they should, then something wiil. 
Q: What's your next opportunity to do that? 
A: Weil, probably we won't have another board meeting until first part of September. 
Q: So do you just stew on this until then? 
A: Well, not exactly, but there are times when icali Steve and ask him what the hell's going on and so forth. But until we have a board 
meeting I won't have an oppodunity to meet with the other board members. 
Q: Have you told him directly that you think it's time for him to move on? 
A: No. I haven't. 
Q: Are Appleton's hobbies as a stunt pilot and racecar driver distracting him from his job? 
A: Honestly. I don't think it is. because this guy's a pretty dedicated guy. He does do some of that but everybody does something to kind of 
relieve their tensions and so forth, and that just happens to be something he does. But in all reaiily I don't think it gets in the way of what he's 
trying to do for Micron. 
Q: How would you summarize your criticism of Appletan? 
A: I just don't think he's a money-maker. I think he's a heiluva guy, and he's dedicated, and he's got gwd personal habits. But you know, 
there's several different ways to run a company but I think you have to have the shareholders interest at heart, especially in a public 
corporation. And thars what you've got to be focused on. 
Q: Has he been too shy of cost-cutting and too protective of jobs in Idaho? 
A: I lhlnk irs been a real factor. He's been very, very reiuctanl to try lo do &hat he's doing naw. And I can understand that. But I mink probably 
where the mistake was made is that we let these departments and everyihing grow t w  big and become t w  cumbersome And you know, yo5 
get t w  many people involved and this is what happens 
Q: When should the costcutting have started? 
A: Llke I told yw I thlnk we really should have tanen a hard look at ths five or six years ago. But il's more involved than that. It goas back to 
strategic plantimg: What dircclion are you gonna go? That's uhere I kinda lhink vre fell down is not being able to put tnat road map out in ton! 
of everybody and say this is the direction we need to be going 
0 :  Has Micron's loss of leadership in die size and the number of layers on a chip been important to the decline in competiiveness? 
A: Sure. power is a big issue. Size is a big issue. Speed is a big issue. Those are the things thal you need to work on. 
Q: Has research and development not kept up ilke It did in the old days? 
A: We've got a tremendous effort out there. My feeling is that a lot of those guys have really wme up with some greatthings, but we seem to 
have a real tough problem in geeing those ideas to market. We're atways maybe just a lime late. 
Q: Is there an example of that? 
4: You take Samsung, o x  largest cornpelttor. We all seem to be working on the same thing, but it seems to me like theyre the ones that are 
gorterally in the mahot 6rst Ann that llas a big impact because if yw can get into the market with a product ahead of the other guy your 
chances of mak~ng a tot of money are really great. But once tne rest of 'em catch up and get lnto the market. then there go the margins. 
Q: What do you think of the decision to sell Micron PC and Mlcron Custom Manufacturing Services? Wouldn't that help you in a 
down market like this? 
4: No. Thars a hlghly competitive - geeing into that retail market and evelything. thal's tough. And even people that are in it struggle. 
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Q: YOU Served on board wtth the Joe and Ward Parkinson, Jack Simplot, Allen Noble. Ron Yanke and Tom Nicholsm. YOU me1 
everv Monday at 6 a.m. and some would show up at 4 p.m. Mondays to watch management's weekly reports. It was very hands on 
The Eurrent board had seven meetings in fiscal 2006. Which works bener? 
A: Well, if you can get a board thars more hands on and if you have a culture where people feel they can talk to other people and they can 
discuss problems and things like that, I think that's a lot betler atmosphere than having one that's so formal and everyihing's structured, that 
you just don't get as much accomplished. 
Q: Is it naive to think youcan have a board like that? In 1895,24 percent of the company was owned by oficers and directors and 
now it's 2 percent, so you don't have the personal stake7 
A: Thars true ... 1t.s a question of focus. And if you bring a board member on, you ought to look for a board member that's focused on making 
money and is wncerned about shareholder value and things like that. if you bring pwple on that are just interested in having their name on a 
board of directors somewhere, then I think that's wrong. 
Q: Is that the case wlth some of your colleagues- it's for the resume and the $225,000 you get as a director? 
A: Let me say thm: I think it's becoming more and more difficult to find good board members. And it's a real job to find the kind of board 
member that you really would like. 
Q: Should a shareholder or citizen of ldahobe concerned that two of the directors have connections to Lam Research. which 
Micron paid $89 milllon in fiscal 20067 is that a problem? Are they truly independent directon? 
A. When we brought (Lam Research Corp. CEO James) Bagley on as a board member (in 1997), 1 think it was the board's feeling and mine 
too. that here's a guy that travels around the world, he's in all the other companies, he's probably got something that would be very valuable to 
Micron - iust his knowledae of what's aoina on in the world. And to a certain extent. Jim's been very valuable in that respect. But t lhink 
underlyingthat is the fact &at he does L o w  that he has a lot of business with Micron 
Q: Does that compromise hls independence7 Is It going to be harder to convince Bagiey that it's time for Appleton to move on 
because of hls company's buslness relationship wlth Micron? 
A: I think Jim would test the water very carefully, and if he felt like maybe Steve would be ail right with something like'that, then I think he'd 
support it. 
Q: Are you saying he'd be more loyal to Appleton than the shareholders? 
A: I can't accuse him of that. 
Q: But he wouldn't force him oul7 
A: He wouldn't force him out 
Q: Will you try to force Appleton out? 
A: I'm not gonna really - I'm just going to tell the board how I feel about it. And I'm gonna tell them that its time, that this company needs a 
wmplete overhaul as far as structure goes. And we need to become more focused on making money and these are the kind of the people 
that we need. And that's gonna kinda be my pitch. 
Q: Will you make that pitch Informally between now and September? 
A: I've already expressed my feelings, but obviously, we're gonna have some morediscussion. 
Q: Have you said directly to your colleagues that It's time to replace Appleton? 
A: No. I haven't. But I'm certainly going to make them aware of my feelings. About theonly opportunity I'll have is the next board meeting .... 
Let me say something. I probably did a lime more talking than I really intended to. And I hope you appreciate the situation because there are a 
lot of people who are concerned, there's a lot of people who have feelings one way or another, and I'd have to say this, that i know Steve is 
very. very wncerned about this whole thing. So. I guess I'd say be real careful about how you present it. 
Q: I understand you're sticking your neck out and you're asking us to be mindful of that. Is that what you're saying7 
A: Not so much that, other than the fact that it's a sensitive situation for a lot of people. And this is just one man's opinion 
Q: You don't have a consensus on the board to do any of this? 
A: That's right. 
Q: Is there anything the state can do to  encourage Micron to grow here7 
A YOU know. l tlunk the problems tnat tney've go1 are more worldwde tn nature because a really bolls down lo a ampctetllive situation How do 
wo mmDete w!tb a plan! in Chtna versus one in the U S 7 If we were Just wmpetlng wth U S manufacturers we could get r ght on top of thls 
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and probably beat 'em. But when you turn out a wafer here that wsts us anywhere from $1.800 to $2,000 or maybe more and China can turn 
out the same damn wafer for six, seven, eight hundred doilars, thars tough. 
Q: How much of Micron is going to remain in Boise? 
A: That I can't teli you but I would teli you for sure that I know Steve would do everything he can to keep as much of it here as he possibly 
could. I think the board would feel that way. There's none of the board members that want to see our foreign operations grow at the expense 
of what we've got here in the U.S. 
Q: How about the rumors of a private equlty buyout involving the Blackstone Group or another bidder? Is there any truth to that? 
A: That3 something that I wuidn't comment on because I don't even know enough about it. 
Q: Have they been nosing around? 
A: Not to my knowledge. I've heard rumors, but i haven't actually seen any evidence of it .... The only thing I can say is I don't really know 
anything about it 
Q: Could the Boise site be convertedto manufacture 300mm wafers? 
A. I don't think thnt'a the LSSOP The issale is do mrr have to move some of that oroductlon somewhere else to be more comoetitive. To Asia or . . ........ .. . .... . .......,.. - - - - -  - - ~ ~ 7~~~~ ~ ~ 
somewhere liue that. Tnere's a huge market ovet there. Between India and China you're talking awut damn near 3 billton people ana you 
firtow they've just come around lo tne fact that everybooy wants a cell phone. ana everybody wants a new automobile. And you know ips a 
huge market But if you can hre an eng,tleer. a topnotch engineer lhat maybe has even been (rained in the Unlted States for say $25,000 to 
$30.000 a year and you pay the same guy here maybe $175.000, that's tough wmpetition 
(2. Are there any advantages to staying here in ldaho? 
A: I'd say the only advantage 1s if you can make what you have here work. You don't have any more brick and mortar to spend money on, can 
we become more efficient, can we get our wsts down? You know, it's worth a try. 
Q: Is any effort being put into that? 
A: Absolutely 
Q: You're making every effort to keep as many jobs in ldaho as you can? 
A: Oh yeah. 
Q: Five years from now, could you predict where Micron will be in ldaho and how iarge i t  will be? 
A Vve,l, there's a lot of ifs But niy feeling is If we are able to do some ot tne tti#lys that I th nn need to be done. I inink tnefe's a heck of a 
good chance we ca l  have a ~ lable wmpan) and 11Ii be dotng good 
Q: And its presence in ldaho? 
A: And I'd say there's no reason why there shouldn't be a good presence in ldaho and maybe in the rest of the world, too. 
Q: What's it going t o  take to turn the stock price around? 
A: There's only one thing that's going to turn that around. We're going to have to make money. And I think thars possible but we've got to get 
at I\. It might take a whole new management group that can get this job done, including maybe a new board of directors. 
Q: Could that happen in September? 
A: No, no. There'd have to be a timeline you'd have to walk down. 
Lel me say tnts to you: We havc got some rea1.y great people our there a! Micron. A lot of Uiese gd)s that work in all these oepartments and 
wmk in those labs and 81 the RBD. And I've seen those guys - most of mem are young g ~ ) s  with a lot of gosd ideas -and snool. they'll 
work ail hours of the day to get the job done. 
Q: And you want to make i t  posslble for them to keep working here? 
A: Exadty. 
Q: Why has Micron been reluctant to talk to the media about layoffs7 
A: Well, I think the reluctance is - and I have the same reluctance - you hate to say very muoh about anylhing bemuse you honestly don't 
know exactly what will happen and what won't. And everybody is hoping that these cuts are not gonna go any deeper than they already have 
So, there's a real reluctance on the part of anybody out there to say too much 
Q: Did you know Appleton has spoken to one media outlet, KTVB. He won't talk t o  us, hasn't in many months. 
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A: Why? 
Q: Apparently something to do with reporting his injuries in his plane crash were worse than he originally said. You dldn't know 
that? 
A: That's the first time I've heard that 
Q: Did you know we'd been blackballed? 
A: NO. Nor anybody else ... You know I don't have any knowledge of why 
Q: In 2003, the company was more forthcoming about layoffs. What3 dlfferent this time? Is it that the situation more gave, a 
wholesaie restrudurlng as opposed to temporary downsizing that's market related? 
A: No, no. I wouldn't characterize it as that. Whafs going on is they're hying to get the company back into a position where they can make 
money and they're competitive and that's what's driving it. 
Q: DO you recall the company being more forthcoming in '037 
A: No, honestly. l'd say it's about the same. 
Q: Do you think the company's been fair to the employees with severance packdges? 
A There's a lot of mmpantes throughout !he U S that are golc:g through lhls kind of a s<tbatlon r,gnt now. Mowrola 8s one, and even Salllsung 
nas startea restr~ctunna, esoeclallv thelr cnlp busmess So they're al, going through it And I thlnk our people are trying lo stay pretty much in 
line with what the indusi~s doing.?hey're p;obably not doing any more, but they're certainly trying not to do any less 
Q: So you think it's been fair when compared to the rest of the marketplace? 
A: Yeah. Absolutely. 
Q: Is is e reasonable expectation that you can keep the majority of your operations In the United States? 
A: Well, I wwldnl say that. I'd say that you don't know for.sure what you have to do. But the question would be is to try to keep as much of 
the business as you can in the United States and be as mmpetitie. And just because somebody else thinks they have to move their 
producUon to China doesn't mean we have to, unless that's the only way to be competitive .... 
I m glv~nq yo4 one person's oplnion It's ~ I n d  of the way I see it and the way i fee4 Non, there m~ght be other ward members tnat ~ou lo  
dtsagree wth me 10c ilercenl And Ihc sarne wlth maybe Steve and some of hs  people - lhey may not see it the way I see 11 
Q: We haven't been able to put questions dirediy to the company. so it's enormously helpful tQ have you talk to us. What I hear you 
saying Is, I'm one of seven, these are my views. H doesn't mean the company's going to do what i thlnk. I have one vote. 
A: Yeah 
Q. YOU wouldn't say that your call for Appleton's departure Is insignificant, would you? 
A: No, but I'd preface that in that in effect he's had three titles for quite some time. What I'm saying is the wmpany is in a very bad need of 
some real solid strategic direction. OK? One man can't fill all those slots. 
Q: Maybe I misunderstand you. When you say it's time for him to move on, you meant leave the company? Are you saylng that he 
just needs to take a lesser role? 
A: Here again, this is just my opinion. I don't know that he could be effective by taking a lesser role. 
Q: So you are saying it's time for him to live on the fruits of his laborthat have been very substantial or find another job? 
A: Yeah. I think so. And i think the next time around the wmpany needs to restructure at the very top lev&. This idea of ietting oneguy have 
three titles and trying to be everything to everybody - that doesn't work. And the culture of the wmpany has to change. 
If you really boiled it down to the bottom line: No. 1, everybody has to be profit-oriented, everybody has to be cash-flow oriented. Bottom line 
that's what should be the criteria. How much cash-flow can you develop and how proftable. 
This idea of trying to run a wmpany and not pay attention to those basics is crazy. 
Q: Will you teli Appleton that he should talk to the media? 
A: I'll do it. Hey listen. I'm gonna teli him that I talked to you. I don't want him to get biindsided 
Exhibit C 
(Exhibit D to Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Motion Filed October 12,2007) 
CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 
The Division has a policy of according leniency to 
corporations reporting their illegal antitrust activity at an 
early stage, if they meet certain conditions. "Leniency" means 
not charging such a firm criminally for the activity being 
reported. (The policy also is known as the corporate amnesty or 
corporate immunity policy.) 
A. Leniencv Before an Investiqation Haa Bequn 
Leniency will be granted to a corporation reporting illegal 
activity before an investigation has begun, if the following six 
conditions are met: 
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the 
illegal activity, the Division has not received information 
about the illegal activity being reported from any other 
source ; 
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal 
activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to 
terminate its part in the activity; 
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and 
completeness and provides full, continuing and complete 
cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation; 
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as 
opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or 
officials; 
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to 
injured parties; and 
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to 
participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the 
leader in, or originator of, the activity. 
B. Alternative Reauirements for Leniency 
If a corporation comes forward to report illegal antitrust 
activity and does not meet all six of the conditions set out in 
Part A, above, the corporation, whether it comes forward before 
or after an investigation has begun, will be granted leniency if 
the following seven conditions are met: 
1. The corporation is the first one to come forward and 
qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity 
being reported; 
2. The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does 
not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to 
result in a sustainable conviction; 
3. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal 
activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to 
terminate its part in the activity; 
4. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and 
completeness and provides full, continuing and complete 
cooperation that advances the Division in its investigation; 
5 .  The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as 
opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or 
officials; 
6. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to 
injured parties; and 
7. The Division determines that granting leniency would not 
be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal 
activity, the confessing corporation's role in it, and when 
the corporation comes forward. 
In applying condition 7, the primary considerations will be 
how early the corporation comes forward and whether the 
corporation coerced another party to participate in the illegal 
activity or clearly was the leader in, or originator of, the 
activity. The burden of satisfying condition 7 will be low if 
the corporation comes forward before the Division has begun an 
investigation into the illegal activity. That burden will 
increase the closer the Division comes to having evidence that is 
likely to result in a sustainable conviction. 
C. Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Em~lovees 
If a corporation qualifies for leniency under Part A, above, 
all directors, officers, and employees of the corporation who 
admlt their involvement in the illegal antitrust activity as part 
of the corporate confession will receive leniency, in the form of 
not being charged criminally for the illegal activity, if they 
admlt their wrongdoing with candor and completeness and continue 
to assist the Division throughout the investigation. 
If a corporation does not qualify for leniency under Part A, 
above, the directors, officers, and employees who come forward 
with the corporation will be considered for immunity from 
criminal prosecution on the same basis as if they had approached 
the Division individually. 
D. Leniency Procedure 
If the staff that receives the request for leniency believes 
the corporation qualifies for and should be accorded leniency, it 
should forward a favorable recommendation to the Office of 
Operations, setting forth the reasons why leniency should be 
granted. Staff should not delay making such a recommendation 
until a fact memo recommending prosecution of others is prepared. 
The Director of Operations will review the request and forward it 
to the Assistant Attorney General for final decision. If the 
staff recommends against leniency, corporate counsel may wish to 
seek an appointment with the Director of Operations to make their 
views known. Counsel are not entitled to such a meeting as a 
matter of right, but the opportunity will generally be afforded. 
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